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Maintaining the performance of infrastructure-dependent systems in the face of surprises 
and unknowable risks is a grand challenge. Addressing this issue requires a better 
understanding of enabling conditions or principles that promote system resilience in a 
universal way. In this study, a set of such principles is interpreted as a group of interrelated 
conditions or organizational qualities that, taken together, engender system resilience. The 
field of Resilience Engineering identifies basic system or organizational qualities (e.g., 
abilities for learning) that are associated with enhanced general resilience and has packaged 
them into a set of principles that should be fostered. However, supporting conditions that 
give rise to such first-order system qualities remain elusive in the field. An integrative 
understanding of how such conditions co-occur and fit together to bring about resilience, 
therefore, has been less clear. This paper contributes to addressing this gap by identifying a 
potentially more comprehensive set of principles for building general resilience in 
infrastructure-dependent systems. In approaching this aim, we organize scattered notions 
from across the literature. To reflect the partly self-organizing nature of infrastructure-
dependent systems, we compare and synthesize two lines of research on resilience: 
Resilience Engineering and social-ecological system resilience. Although some of the 
principles discussed within the two fields overlap, there are some nuanced differences. By 
comparing and synthesizing the knowledge developed in them, we recommend an updated 
set of resilience-enhancing principles for infrastructure-dependent systems. In addition to 
proposing an expanded list of principles, we illustrate how these principles can co-occur and 
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Natural and man-made disasters around the globe have, over recent decades, 
generated widespread interest in increased resilience of infrastructure-dependent systems in 
which human society and built components are inextricably linked. The significance of the 
issue has led to several efforts in the broader safety and risk sciences aimed at identifying 
various enabling conditions that may be associated with improved resilience in such systems 
in a universal way (Francis & Bekera, 2014; Erik Hollnagel, 2014; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). 
Some of these conditions have been synthesized into a set of general principles that inform 
our thinking about what seems wise to do or what needs to be seriously considered for 
building and assessing resilience (Bruneau et al., 2003; Costella, Saurin, & de Macedo 
Guimarães, 2009; E. Hollnagel, Woods, & Leveson, 2006). Here, a set of such principles is 
interpreted as a group of interrelated conditions, rules of thumb, or organizational qualities 
that, taken together, engender some system-level ability (which in our case is resilience) in 
an infrastructure-dependent system (e.g., Van Asselt & Renn, 2011). Although there is no 
single definitive list of principles for enhancing resilience in infrastructure-dependent 
systems, some common themes run through the body of literature with an eye to the subject: 
reduce the sensitivity of system performance to shocks and enhance the adaptive capacity 
of responding organizations under unexpected situations. 
 
In pursuing these broad themes, it is important to not lose sight of the fact that 
infrastructure-dependent systems are not isolated from the broader social, ecological, and 
technological contexts within which they are embedded to function, e.g. cities, ecosystems, 
etc. (Lloyd‘s Register Foundation, 2015; Meerow, Newell, & Stults, 2016). The discussion 
about principles for building resilience in such complex systems, therefore, requires a 
broader perspective that takes into account more than just built systems and organizations 
involved in operating them. In other words, an infrastructure and its operating organizations 
may be structured to maintain some functions with a certain level of robustness and 
reliability and adaptive margins, but actual outcomes may depend on how linked social or 
ecological components self-organize in response to designed structures, often in unexpected 
ways and with potential changes to qualitative system behavior (Muneepeerakul & Anderies, 
2017; Yu, Qubbaj, Muneepeerakul, Anderies, & Aggarwal, 2015). An example is how levees 
and dams can be built and operated to contain flooding with a certain recurrence period. 
Empirical evidence shows that such designs are often associated with a decline in long-term 
resilience to rarer flooding because of self-organization of societal response, i.e., 
encroachment of economic activities on floodplains, gradual loss of flood memory among 
people, and path dependency towards more techno-centric solutions (Di Baldassarre et al., 
2015; Logan, Guikema, & Bricker, 2018). Similarly, it has been shown that the building of 
levees in river deltas can disrupt natural delta-building processes (sand and mud 
accumulation in regularly flooded wetlands that surround river channels) and cause deltas to 
self-organize in ways that exacerbate land-sea level difference and flood risk in the long run 
(Temmerman & Kirwan, 2015). Thus, consideration of an infrastructure and its operating 
organization in isolation cannot capture the conditions of full resilience. We will argue here 
that resilience of an infrastructure and the broader system in which it functions emerges from 
the interplay between design and self-organization of societal and ecological responses. Do 
principles for resilience currently discussed by scholars based in safety and risk sciences, in 
particular Resilience Engineering (E. Hollnagel et al., 2006), sufficiently reflect this notion? 
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partly self-organizing nature of infrastructure-dependent systems? Such knowledge, if 
available, would better inform design of infrastructure-dependent systems in ways that 
prevent them from self-organizing towards a state with reduced resilience. 
 
Furthermore, given that some principles for Resilience Engineering and related 
studies tend to be high-level guidelines about organizational and built system qualities (e.g., 
foster ability for learning, adapting, etc.), it is important to probe deeper to understand which 
underlying or second-order conditions give rise to such first-order qualities. For example, 
under what set of supporting conditions are organizational abilities for learning and 
adaptation encouraged? However, principles that touch on such second-order conditions in 
an integrative way have been elusive in Resilience Engineering. This difficulty arises in part 
because, while such supporting conditions tend to be discussed and recognized within 
safety and risk sciences, they are scattered across the literature, thus hindering an 
integrative understanding about how they might co-occur or be dependent on one another 
(see Hollnagel (2014) for an exception, which shows dependencies among some basic 
organizational abilities). For example, user participation, diversity in stakeholders‘ views and 
experience, and elements of social capital such as trust, social network and norms that 
reduce the cost of exchange tend to co-occur in organizations that effectively co-manage a 
natural resource system (R. Biggs, Schlüter, & Schoon, 2015). Thus, an approach that (i) 
organizes scattered discussions about conditions linked to resilience-enhancing basic 
system qualities and (ii) delineates how such conditions co-occur and collectively fit together 
to engender resilience would provide an added benefit to this line of research. 
 
The objective of this paper is to contribute to organizing a more comprehensive set of 
principles that includes various basic and supporting conditions for promoting resilience in 
infrastructure-dependent systems as discussed in safety and risk sciences. In doing so, we 
reflect on the partly self-organizing nature of such systems and integrate scattered notions 
and interrelationships among relevant conditions. In our analysis, we focus on the resilience-
enhancing principles discussed within Resilience Engineering (which we hereafter refer to by 
the abbreviation RE), a field of study that is concerned with how organizations can better 
manage socio-technical system to deal with change and disruption (Bergström, Winsen, & 
Henriqson, 2015; E. Hollnagel et al., 2006). Adopting a comparative approach. we also draw 
on the resilience-enhancing principles discussed in another strand of resilience research, 
namely the field of social-ecological system resilience (Folke, 2006). We take this approach 
because the study of social-ecological system resilience has long focused on the self-
organizing nature of complex systems and developed extensive prior work that seeks to 
organize resilience-enhancing principles (R. Biggs et al., 2015), and also because RE 
scholars often refer back the original definition of ecological or social-ecological resilience in 
their own discussions (e.g., Erik Hollnagel, 2014). Through a comparative analysis of the two 
fields, we examine if there are principles currently widely accepted in social-ecological 
system resilience (and less explicitly recognized or evident within RE) that might benefit the 
aims and ambitions within RE. We evaluate such principles with respect to what they can 
bring to the RE field and build on that knowledge to identify a potentially more 
comprehensive set of resilience-enhancing principles for the field.  
 
 
1.1. State of the Art: Current Principles and Gaps 
 
Research on the resilience of infrastructure-dependent systems is actively pursued 
by academics in the field of Resilience Engineering (RE) and related disciplines. RE is a 
popular paradigm for safety management that appears to blend and extend ideas from 
multiple lines of research, including C.S. Holling‘s notion of ecological resilience (Holling & 
Meffe, 1996), the theory of high-reliability organizations (La Porte, 1996), and Jens 
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systems (J. Rasmussen, 1990). RE was initiated at a symposium in Sweden in 2004 as a 
complementary approach to the traditional risk perspective, which is largely centered on the 
notion of robustness, or resistance, to failures based on probabilistic risk assessments, e.g., 
levees to prevent flooding from a 1-in-200 year flood (although the recent risk analysis 
approaches have advanced to reflect resilience, governance, and communication aspects) 
(Bergström et al., 2015; Righi, Saurin, & Wachs, 2015). RE has its roots in the recognition 
that focusing only on robust, or fail-safe, engineering design may lead to a false sense of 
security and hidden vulnerabilities that are difficult to detect until they are revealed by a 
catastrophic failure (Park, Seager, Rao, Convertino, & Linkov, 2013). If and when safety and 
reliability are taken for granted, complacency sets in, uncertainties in risk assessment are 
ignored, and changing risk profiles are not examined; all the while, intangible organizational 
and societal capacities that play a critical role during emergencies gradually wither away. 
Disastrous consequences of relying on fail-safe systems under changing definitions of 
acceptable risk were evident in New Orleans (Hurricane Katrina), Houston (Hurricane 
Harvey), Fukushima (tsunami and nuclear crisis), and New York (Super Storm Sandy), 
among many others, including non-urban systems like the Space Shuttle Challenger 
disaster.  
 
In contrast, RE calls for embracing uncertainty and variability as opportunities for 
fostering an ability to cope with uncertainty and stress (Linkov et al., 2014; D. D. Woods, 
2015). The conceptual roots of RE are traced back to process and systems engineering 
work seeking to enhance safety and improve performance in hazardous manufacturing 
settings, digging deeper into the traditional and omnipresent label of ―human error‖ (Jens 
Rasmussen, 1997; D. D. Woods, 2003; D Woods & Wreathall, 2003). It is unsurprising, 
therefore, that this work has gained traction in fields like infrastructure design and aerospace 
engineering where total failure of systems comes at extreme cost and rapid recovery is often 
essential. It is important to realize, however, that RE does not replace risk analysis and that 
the two approaches are complementary, especially given the fact that the field of risk 
analysis has progressed to put a greater emphasis on the consequences of an uncertain 
event—a function of both robustness and recovery (Aven, 2019). In other words, the 
consequences of an uncertain event on a system are a reflection of both the time period the 
system state is below a desired level (which pertains to robustness) and the recovery time to 
return to a desired state and the capacity to shorten this time (which is related to resilience).  
Returning to our discussion on the emergence of RE, the term resilience was initially 
adopted by RE theorists as ―the intrinsic ability of an organization (system) to maintain or 
regain a dynamically stable state, which allows it to continue operations after a major mishap 
and/or in the presence of a continuous stress‖ (E. Hollnagel et al., 2006). This early definition 
accepted the bi-stable nature of an organization or system (i.e., a stable functional state and 
a failed state) and emphasized an ability to maintain or regain the functional state in the face 
of stress and adversity. This conceptual ground is similar to that of ecological resilience in 
the social-ecological systems literature, which is also about how systems with multi-stability 
persist or reorganize in response to change (Folke, 2006).  
 
More recently, three important developments have been observed in RE and the 
broader safety and risk-related field. First, the ability of a system to extend and adjust to 
change, termed adaptive capacity, has taken a central stage. This has led to an updated 
definition of resilience within RE given by ―the intrinsic ability of a system to adjust its 
functioning prior to, during, or following changes and disturbances, so that it can sustain 
required operations under both expected and unexpected conditions‖ (Erik Hollnagel, Pariès, 
Woods, & Wreathall, 2010). This revised definition, which is similar to that of social-
ecological resilience, underscores that RE is about being able to adapt in response to the 
unknown and the unknowable and not just about increasing the robustness to anticipated 
events (Park et al., 2013). Second, there is a growing appreciation of the fact that 
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influenced in part by Jens Rasmussen‘s work on systems view (Jens Rasmussen, 1997) 
where he showed that multiple organizational levels and analytical perspectives are needed 
to understand safety management of socio-technical systems. Infrastructure-dependent 
systems are embedded in social, ecological, and technical elements and processes that are 
connected and constantly in flux (Lloyd‘s Register Foundation, 2015; C. Murphy & Gardoni, 
2006). Third, much interest has recently developed in the interdependencies of multiple 
infrastructure systems, i.e., coupling, a two-way relationship in which the state of one 
infrastructure depends on the state of another infrastructure (Nan & Sansavini, 2017). 
Amidst complex interactions and given the tightly coupled nature of modern built systems, 
questions of how vulnerabilities emerge and evolve and how failures cascade through 
various forms of interdependencies in infrastructures (Rinaldi, Peerenboom, & Kelly, 2001) 
are gaining traction for diagnosing and understanding resilience.  
 
In light of these developments, there is now a growing consensus among RE 
theorists that the capacity for resilience as described by the more recent definition (Erik 
Hollnagel et al., 2010) is determined by several organizational or system-level abilities 
(Lloyd‘s Register Foundation, 2015). Hollnagel et al. (2006) provide a group of interrelated 
basic system abilities (also called cornerstones of RE) and use them to distinguish between 
systems with differing levels of resilience. These abilities are 1) the ability to monitor internal 
states and the external environment of a system, 2) the ability to respond to both regular and 
irregular disruptions using prepared actions as well as adaptive margins, 3) the ability to 
learn from past experience and adjust monitoring and responses, and 4) the ability to 
anticipate so that proactive responses can be made before potential failures occur. Related 
studies share an analogous set of principles. For example, Park et al. (2013) suggest that 
―safe-fail‖ systems (as opposed to ―fail-safe‖ systems) are characterized by the abilities to 
sense, anticipate, adapt, and learn. Synthesizing the work of Rasmussen, Hollnagel, Woods, 
and others (Hale & Heijer, 2006; E. Hollnagel, 2006; Jens Rasmussen, 1997; Wreathall, 
2006), Costella et al. (2009) also packaged a set of RE principles: top management 
commitment to safety (safety culture), learning from accidents and normal work (learning), 
increased flexibility in system design to allow for and tolerably respond to variability 
(flexibility), and awareness of system status through monitoring (awareness). It is also 
worthwhile to note organizational qualities mentioned by high-reliability organization studies 
(La Porte, 1996; Roberts, 1989) and the more recent stream of research on reliability-
seeking virtual organizations (Grabowski & Roberts, 2016), which are important approaches 
to crisis mitigation in built systems. These approaches delineate operating organizations‘ 
traits for achieving reliability in all circumstances, e.g. organizational culture for safety and 
vigilance, attention to design and procedures, redundancy, minimization of trial-and-error 
learning, distributed decision making, and continuous training through simulated exercises 
(Shrivastava, Sonpar, & Pazzaglia, 2009). 
 
Another well-known approach is the R4 Framework (Bruneau & Reinhorn, 2004), 
which argues that resilience to both expected and unexpected disturbances is largely 
determined by the four basic qualities: robustness, resourcefulness, rapidity, and 
redundancy. Robustness is about resisting or remaining insensitive to disturbances; 
redundancy is about enabling substitutability among components in case of a component 
failure; resourcefulness relates to the ability to diagnose problems and mobilize various 
resources to deal with them; and rapidity concerns the recovery of functionality in a timely 
way. An important distinction is that while robustness and rapidity are the desired ―ends‖ that 
are achieved through resilience-enhancing measures taken by actors in a system, 
redundancy and resourcefulness characterize the general features of these measures or the 
―means‖ by which resilience can be improved (Bruneau et al., 2003). Relatedly, it has been 
suggested that socio-technical resilience is characterized by three abilities: absorptive 
capacity, adaptive capacity, and restorative or recovery capacity (Francis & Bekera, 2014; 
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insensitive to disturbances. Adaptive capacity is the ability to adjust to changing conditions, 
especially when the system is maximally challenged to the limit of its absorptive capacity. 
Restorative capacity is the ability to recover functionality in a timely way. As can be inferred, 
these abilities are closely related to the four dimensions of the R4 Framework. Namely, a 
system‘s robustness and rapidity are manifested through the collective operation of 
absorptive, adaptive, and restorative abilities. The three abilities, in turn, are facilitated by 
resourcefulness and redundancy. Resourcefulness encourages adaptive capacity and 
restorative capacity through mobilization of various forms of assets, ranging from physical 
and financial resources, to social and human capital. Redundancy supports absorptive 
capacity through the presence of substitutable components that provide an insurance effect. 
 
The preceding discussion outlined some of the frequently-noted groups of basic 
system or organizational qualities that are thought to be important for resilience in RE and 
the broader safety and risk-related field. A corollary is that, at the most fundamental level, it 
is wise to foster these qualities in order to enhance resilience in infrastructure-dependent 
systems. The current study builds on this existing foundation to probe what supporting or 
second-order conditions may be linked to enhancement of these basic qualities as well as 
what could be common linkages among these qualities. Some such second-order conditions 
are already recognized within RE, but are scattered across the literature. Thus, our approach 
is to integrate such notions to the extent possible and suggest a potentially more 
comprehensive set of RE principles. An underexplored challenge in this regard is that the 
interplay between design and self-organization in infrastructure-dependent systems is subtle 
and multi-faceted, and thus it is not obvious how such basic qualities closely associated with 
resilience can be cultivated (Naikar & Elix, 2019). Specifically, since engineered components 
such as water and energy infrastructures are often inanimate and thus cannot adapt by 
themselves, we echo the view of RE that the capacity of human organizations and the 
broader population to adapt themselves and flexibly manage built components in response 
to change is what truly makes the overall system resilient (although capacity for adaptive 
learning can exist in inanimate components of cyber-physical systems). This adaptive 
capacity, in turn, depends upon a variety of less visible, nonmaterial features such as 
people‘s mental models, the design of governance (rules and norms), and social network 
structures (Folke, Hahn, Olsson, & Norberg, 2005), all of which can influence and can be 
influenced by designed structures.  
 
To facilitate this synthesis, this paper proceeds as follows. In the following section, 
we provide the methodological approach used in this study. In section 3, we compare 
various principles for resilience discussed in the fields of social-ecological systems resilience 
and RE. We examine if there are principles currently widely accepted in social-ecological 
system resilience that might benefit the aim and ambitions within RE and their current status 
in RE. We organize them to suggest an updated list of general principles for RE and further 





Any discussion of approaches to building resilience should start with a clear definition 
of ―resilience of what to what‖ (Carpenter, Walker, Anderies, & Abel, 2001): what is included 
in the system boundary, what is a system performance of interest that needs to be 
maintained, and to which set of disturbances the system performance should develop 
resilience. Following this ground, we specify our focal system as a socio-technical or 
infrastructure-dependent system in which the role of built infrastructure is clearly present. 
The system boundary is, therefore, generalized to include the following multi-layered 
networks: layers of connected physical (built and natural) components over some spatial 
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Adding to the complexity, the system boundary can entail coupling of several such multi-
layered networks, e.g., interdependent system of human-water, human-power, and human-
transportation infrastructure networks in a city.   
 
The system output of interest is some performance measure (e.g., water availability 
per household per day) based on some benefit stream, the supply of which is largely 
dependent on but not limited to a shared built infrastructure. For example, residential water 
supply can be obtained through various means, including the services of specialized 
infrastructure providers (e.g., water utilities), private infrastructure (e.g., private pumping of 
groundwater), social capital (e.g., sharing of water among neighbors), and private market 
mechanisms (e.g., water kiosks, bottled water, etc.). A very broad set of disturbances is 
considered for resilience, spanning both natural and man-made disruptions, expected and 
unexpected ones, and ones that are internal (e.g., social conflicts) and external (e.g., 
extreme climate events) to the system boundary. In essence, we are interested in the 
principles for general resilience, which is about coping with uncertainty in all forms (Folke et 
al., 2010). Note that general resilience contrasts with specified resilience (ibid), which is the 
system capacity to maintain a certain system-level feature or output to a particular set of 
disturbances (e.g., those that are known and previously observed). 
 
We also adopt an expanded view towards what can be considered as an 
infrastructure. Here, an infrastructure is broadly defined to be any physical or non-physical 
construct that is consciously designed by a society to serve a purpose (Anderies, 2014; 
Anderies, Janssen, & Ostrom, 2004; Yu et al., 2015). Under this broader definition, an 
infrastructure can be any physical (e.g., dams, power plants, transportation road networks), 
cyber (e.g., computerized control of subway trains), or regulatory (e.g., procedures, rules, or 
norms that are devised to shape human behavior) component that is designed to achieve a 
particular end. Thus, resilience of an infrastructure-dependent system depends not only on 
built or physical infrastructures, but also on the design and functioning of non-structural, 
regulatory components such as operation rules and governance structures crafted by a 
society. Such components may be understood as the ―software‖ of the infrastructure-
dependent system that enables the functioning of ―hardware‖ comprised of physical and 
cyber components and human interactions with the environment. 
 
2.1. Scoping of Principles for Building Resilience 
 
We investigate what additional insights into the principles for RE can be gained from 
a comparative analysis with the social-ecological systems literature. The latter literature has 
a longer-standing discussion on the principles for enhancing resilience in complex self-
organizing systems (R. Biggs et al., 2015), and thus can be a source of enrichment for the 
principles for RE. Despite this cross-learning potential, a recent review study showed that 
little cross-citation has occurred between RE and other bodies of resilience literature, 
including social-ecological resilience (Fraccascia, Giannoccaro, & Albino, 2018). But, of 
course, just because a principle is widely known in the social-ecological systems literature, it 
cannot be assumed automatically that it also applies to RE. We, therefore, evaluate such a 
principle based on what it brings to RE and how it might benefit the aims of RE. This will be 
achieved primarily through assessing whether notions related to such a principle are already 
recognized in RE and whether they are known to contribute to organizational adaptive 
capacity. To facilitate our comparative approach, we used a number of criteria to short-list 
publications that were carefully analyzed to make our analysis tractable. We chose articles, 
reports, or books that (1) clearly discuss and present a list of heuristics or principles for 
resilience in one or the other literature that are consistent with the Hollnagel‘s definition of 
resilience (Erik Hollnagel et al., 2010) and the concept of general resilience (Folke et al., 
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of scholars who are recognized and cited in one or the other literature. We combined these 
criteria and (4) our own experience to select relevant publications.  
 
For the principles for RE, we selected six publications that meet our criteria: 
Hollnagel et al.(2006), Bruneau and Reinhorn (2004), Park et al.(2013), Francis and Bekera 
(2013), Lloyd‘s Register Foundation (Foundation, 2015), and Costella et al. (2009).These 
studies, led by scholars who are based in RE and safety and risk sciences, discuss a set of 
heuristics for enhancing resilience in complex systems dominated by built infrastructures. 
These studies also cover three major outlets of publication by RE scholars: Risk Analysis, 
Reliability Engineering and System Safety, and Safety Science. The resilience-enhancing 
principles given by these studies, which we discussed in the previous section, can be 
grouped into six recurring themes: reduce sensitivity, build reserve capacity, adapt to 
change, fast recovery, manage interdependencies in infrastructure, and foster safety culture 
(Table I).  
 
For the principles discussed within the social-ecological resilience literature, we 
chose five publications that fit with our criteria: Anderies et al. (2006), Walker et al. (2006), 
Walker and Salt (2006), Carpenter et al.(2012), and Biggs et al. (2015). These studies are 
authored by researchers affiliated with the Resilience Alliance (www.resalliance.org), a 
prominent network of scholars that spearhead the research on social-ecological system 
resilience, and include a major source of publication for this type of research, Ecology and 
Society. Our review of the selected studies shows the principles suggested by them can be 
categorized into a few recurring themes (Table II). First, almost all the studies emphasize the 
importance of maintaining two forms of diversity: response diversity and functional diversity. 
Second, the importance of striking a balance between modularity and openness in system 
connectedness is underscored. Third, the presence of organizational abilities for monitoring, 
learning, and experimentation for adaptive management is highlighted to be important. 
Fourth, the need for better understanding of and management for complexity of systems to 
be governed is stressed, especially with respect to nonlinear transitions in system states, 
cross-scale or cross-level interactions, and potential tradeoffs in vulnerabilities arising from 
such interactions. Lastly, positive effects of intangible social assets such trust, leadership, 
social network, and polycentric governance are highlighted.  
 
Before proceeding further, we acknowledge that the selected publications do not 
constitute an exhaustive list of studies on the subject. Also, the criteria used for selecting the 
publications and the categorization of principles by theme necessarily involve subjective 
interpretation. However, the list largely covers the important principles discussed in the two 
literature. Further, they represent a progression of ideas and capture moments of transition 
within the two literatures. Most importantly, these studies enable us to take a first step to 
compare the views of pioneers of RE and prominent Resilience Alliance thinkers for 
identifying a potentially more integrative set of RE principles.  
 
Table I. Principles for resilience proposed by the Resilience Engineering (RE) community. 
Recurring themes Source Principles for resilience 
Reduce sensitivity Bruneau & Reinhorn (2004) Robustness 
Francis and Bekera (2013) Absorptive capacity 
Build reserve 
capacity 
Bruneau & Reinhorn (2004) Redundancy 
Adapt to change Bruneau & Reinhorn (2004) Resourcefulness  
Francis and Bekera (2013) Adaptive capacity 
Hollnagel et al. (E. Hollnagel et al., 2006) Monitor, learn, respond, and anticipate 
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Costella et al. (Costella et al., 2009) Awareness, learning, and flexibility 
LRF (Lloyd‘s Register Foundation, 2015) Monitor, learn, respond, and anticipate 
Fast recovery Bruneau & Reinhorn (2004) Rapidity 
Francis and Bekera (2013) Restorative capacity  
Recognize 
interdependencies 
LRF (Lloyd‘s Register Foundation, 2015) Interdependencies in critical infrastructure 
Foster safety 
culture 




Table II. Principles for resilience proposed by the social-ecological systems research 
community. 
Recurring themes Source Principles for resilience 
Maintain diversity Walker and Salt (B. H. Walker & Salt, 
2006) 
Walker et al.(2006), 
Carpenter et al. (Carpenter et al., 2012) 
Biggs et al. (R. Biggs et al., 2015) 
Response diversity, functional diversity 
Anderies et al. (Anderies et al., 2006) Response diversity 
Manage 
connectivity 
Walker and Salt (B. H. Walker & Salt, 
2006) 
Modularity 
Carpenter et al. (Carpenter et al., 2012) Openness, modularity 
Biggs et al. (R. Biggs et al., 2015) Connectivity (openness and modularity) 
Encourage 
learning-by-doing 
Walker and Salt (B. H. Walker & Salt, 
2006) 
 
Tightness in feedbacks (monitor and respond), 
innovation (learning and experimentation) 
Walker et al.(B Walker et al., 2006) Learning, experimentation 
Anderies et al. (Anderies et al., 2006) Interventions (monitor and respond) 
Carpenter et al. (Carpenter et al., 2012) Monitoring 
Biggs et al. (R. Biggs et al., 2015) Learning, experimentation 
Manage for 
complexity 
Walker and Salt (B. H. Walker & Salt, 
2006) 
Slow variables 
Walker et al.(B Walker et al., 2006) Adaptive cycle, cross-scale interactions, fast 
and slow variables, critical 3-5 variables, 
tradeoffs in resilience or vulnerability, mental 
models, multiple stable attractors  
Anderies et al. (Anderies et al., 2006) Slow variables, cross-scale interactions, 
tradeoffs in resilience or vulnerability, mental 
models 
Carpenter et al. (Carpenter et al., 2012) Feedbacks 




Walker and Salt (B. H. Walker & Salt, 
2006) 
Social capital (trust, social network, leadership)  
Walker et al.(B Walker et al., 2006) Leadership, trust, social networks 
Anderies et al. (Anderies et al., 2006), 
Carpenter et al. (Carpenter et al., 2012) 
Leadership, trust 
Biggs et al. (R. Biggs et al., 2015) Participation 
Polycentric 
governance 
Walker and Salt (B. H. Walker & Salt, 
2006) 
Nested governance 
Walker et al.(B Walker et al., 2006) Overlap in governance 
Carpenter et al. (Carpenter et al., 2012),  
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3. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
In the following subsections, we provide a brief introduction to well-established 
principles for building social-ecological resilience (Table 2) and discuss their current status in 
and relevance to RE. We end each subsection with our suggestions on whether inclusion of 
a corresponding principle to RE would be beneficial to the field.  
  
 
3.1. Maintain Diversity 
 
Maintenance of diversity is regarded as a key foundation for building resilience in 
complex self-organizing systems. Two types of diversity contribute to resilience. Response 
diversity occurs when multiple components of a system have similar functions (functional 
redundancy) but respond differently to a given disturbance (Elmqvist et al., 2003). Response 
diversity provides an insurance effect, i.e., even if a component cannot withstand a 
disturbance and fails to perform, other components that have the same function may 
withstand it and still allow the overall system to perform. Functional diversity refers to 
variation in system components‘ traits or functions. When system components have more 
diversity in traits or functions, they are more likely to be complementary to one another 
(Scheffer, 2009). This complementarity may enhance overall system performance, because 
the more different types of traits or functions there are, the more outputs and activities are 
likely to be generated in a system through synergistic or complementary combinations of 
these diverse features. For example, functional diversity can stimulate the capacity for 
adaptation and innovation. If a group is comprised of individuals with diverse traits, 
experiences, or resources, it may be able to more effectively deal with unexpected events or 
complex problems than a homogenous group does. However, too much response or 
functional diversity can also lead to issues (R. Biggs et al., 2015). That is, these two types of 
diversity should be maintained at a level that strikes a balance between the danger of rigidity 
(associated with little diversity) and that of inefficiencies (associated with too much diversity). 
In social systems, too little diversity can lead to group think and a siloed perspective, 
whereas too much diversity can result in fragmentation and inability to progress (Elinor 
Ostrom, 2008).  
 
3.1.1. Importance of Diversity in RE 
 
Redundancy (i.e., functionally redundant components with response diversity to a 
disruption) has been recognized as one of the key principles for RE and the broader safety 
and risk sciences (Bruneau et al., 2003; Tierney, 2008), in particular with regards to 
engineered safety features, such as redundant parts and backup resources, that prevent 
component failures in systems from causing a system-wide accident. An underlying idea is 
that, through better engineered safety features and preventive measures, the degree of 
substitutability among system components are strengthened to enhance robustness to 
component failures. An example is how most medical care facilities in the US are required to 
have enough reserve assets (e.g., backup electricity generators, water storage tanks) to 
remain operational during the first 96 hours after public utility failures caused by a disaster 
(Commission, 2009). RE also recognizes that non-physical components, such as 
organizational rules, guidelines, and work procedures, can be designed to build response 
diversity (Bergström et al., 2015). One of the key characteristics of RE is its focus on how 
humans (not technical components) deal with difficult tradeoffs in situations characterized by 
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organizational rules, regulations, guidelines, work procedures, etc. to more tolerably respond 
to a wide variety of disruptions. Rationing of water, electricity, or human resources by 
applying a set of tiered rules that reflect the severity of situations highlights the point of how 
rules can be designed to perform a same function but exhibit response diversity (e.g., Xiao, 
Sanderson, Clayton, & Venkatesh, 2010). For example, some farmer-managed irrigation 
systems that operate on water diversion structure and distribution networks (weirs and 
canals) adaptively switch their water distribution rules to buffer the impact of water shortages 
(Cifdaloz, Regmi, Anderies, & Rodriguez, 2010). When the supply of water from river to 
irrigation canals is abundant, farmers freely take water anytime (open-flow distribution rule). 
But when available water gets scarcer, farmers activate a tiered response by taking water in 
a certain order (sequential distribution rule) or in time-restricted rotations (12-hour and 24-
hour rotation distribution rules). These rules are functionally redundant. However, for a given 
level of water shortage, these variations in rules lead to different outcomes in terms of the 
total crop yield of the whole system.  
 
Functional diversity is recognized within RE and related studies, in particular with 
reference to how variations and complementarity in the skills and experience of the front-end 
staffs and decision makers can contribute to adaptive capacity under complex situations 
(Bergström et al., 2015; Gomes, Borges, Huber, & Carvalho, 2014). It is important to note 
that diversity in system components‘ traits or functions that are other than organizational 
competence can also lead to complementary effects that otherwise cannot be achieved with 
homogeneous components. An example is how numerous communities in the US employ a 
host of different measures to deal with flood hazards (EPA, 2014; Loucks, 2015). Structural 
measures such as dams and levees contain high waters. Non-structural measures such as 
forecasting and flood warning, flood insurance, building and planning codes, buy-outs of 
properties, and rules for evacuation contribute to functions that are not directly related to 
containing high waters. Yet, these other functions can be just as important for reducing 
vulnerabilities to flooding. Compared to a community that uniformly relies only on flood 
control structures, a community that adopts diverse measures from structural and non-
structural options is less likely to be vulnerable to floods due to their complementary effects. 
Aerts et al. found that developing portfolios of infrastructure investments (physical and 
social) that diversify risk can reduce the overall risk of the system (Aerts, Botzen, Veen, 
Krywkow, & Werners, 2008).  
 
Diversity, both in terms of response and functions, can influence self-organization of 
societal response. For example, response diversity in infrastructure components can lead to 
overlaps or redundancies in infrastructure services. This redundancy gives individuals an 
‗exit‘ option (Hirschman, 1970) that can have far-reaching effects on the way that these 
infrastructure services are managed over time. When individuals perceive declining quality in 
infrastructure service (either in performance or reliability), they will likely exit or switch to 
another similar infrastructure provider or relocate to where a better performing infrastructure 
exists, i.e., vote with their feet (Tiebout, 1956). Aggregation of these individual responses 
can give a powerful feedback to infrastructure providers to enhance the performance and 
reliability of their infrastructure services. As for functional diversity, variations and 
complementarity in the skills and experience of organizational staffs and in the coping 
measures used by them can help infrastructure-dependent systems to self-organize and 
better adapt under unexpected circumstances (Naikar & Elix, 2019). 
 
In summary, both response and functional diversities are well recognized within RE. 
Whereas traditional safety management tended to focus on response diversity in the form of 
engineered safety features and overlook functional diversity in organizational features, RE 
promotes variations in terms of both response and functions to meet its aim of fostering 
ability to respond to change and surprise (Bergström et al., 2015). Thus, RE stands to gain 
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principles. An aspect that can be further elaborated and emphasized by RE is that response 
and functional diversities in rules, work procedures, or institutional arrangements (regulatory 
infrastructure), not just in technical components (physical or cyber infrastructure) and the 
front-end staff and management team competence (human capital), can contribute to 
resilience.         
 
 
3.2. Manage Connectivity 
 
Connectivity is defined here as a multi-layered network of built components and 
processes and a nested hierarchy of interacting social units that function to produce and 
distribute a continuous flow of essential goods and services (e.g., water, energy, mobility, 
etc.) for the broader society. Two features of connectivity influence resilience in complex 
systems that provide such essential services. Modularity refers to the degree of 
compartmentalization in a system (B. H. Walker & Salt, 2006). Openness refers to the ease 
with which diffusion can proceed within and across a system (Carpenter et al., 2012). The 
specifics of how modularity and openness affects resilience depend on the context, i.e., the 
nature of nodes and links in the connected system structure. When nodes and links 
represent physical components and flows of resources (e.g., water, energy, or output from a 
node is an input to another) respectively, modularity can enhance resilience because a 
highly compartmentalized system is less likely to be impacted by failures of other (sub-) 
systems due to its low dependency on others. In comparison, an overly open or connected 
system can be fragile because disturbances can spread more quickly and more broadly 
across the system (R. Biggs et al., 2015). When nodes and links represent social agents and 
their interactions (e.g., exchange of information or cooperative relationship among front-end 
staffs across organizations), openness can support resilience because better flow of 
knowledge or networks of direct or generalized exchange (Bearman, 1997) can facilitate 
self-organization towards faster recovery and a more effective response under unexpected 
disturbances. However, when links deal with the harms that diffuse through social 
interactions (e.g., false information, computer virus, etc.), too much openness in the system 
structure can undermine resilience (R. Biggs et al., 2015). As such, regardless of context, 
identifying the optimal level of modularity and openness is important.   
 
An important related notion is the problem of ―fit‖ in social-ecological networks (Ö. 
Bodin, 2017; Folke, Pritchard, Berkes, Colding, & Svedin, 2007). The problem of social-
ecological fit pertains to how well the structure of a collaborative social network aligns with 
the specifics of the environmental problem being addressed or with the structure of the 
biophysical system being governed (ibid). The temporal and spatial extents of ecosystem 
processes often span beyond the boundaries of a collaborative network of stakeholders. A 
misfit occurs when the collaborative governance network takes into account only a part of 
such temporal or spatial extents of ecosystem processes. This can lead to an environmental 
problem. Further, the level of fit in a social-ecological network may directly affect the 
capacity of human or social nodes to self-organize, i.e., how well they can coordinate with 
each other for some objective related to the governance of biophysical nodes (Ö. Bodin & 
Tengö, 2012).  
 
 
3.2.1. Importance of Connectivity in RE 
 
Our assessment is that modularity and openness are recognized to be important in 
the RE and the broader safety literature (e.g., Holmgren, 2006), although these two features 
are not explicitly mentioned in some of the widely-accepted general principles for RE. This 
recognition is evident from studies related to resilience of and cascading failures in coupled 
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connectivity in a system (e.g., scale-free, random, etc.) can impact robustness against 
failures such as blackout of a station in electric power grids (Kim, Eisenberg, Chun, & Park, 
2017; Nan & Sansavini, 2017; Schneider, Yazdani, Araújo, Havlin, & Herrmann, 2013; 
Vespignani, 2010). Furthermore, in systems involving multiple coupled networks (e.g., power 
and telecommunications networks), interdependencies across those networks can make the 
system vulnerable to cascading failure (Ash & Newth, 2007; Bashan, Berezin, Buldyrev, & 
Havlin, 2013).  For example, Buldyrev et al. (Buldyrev, Parshani, Paul, Stanley, & Havlin, 
2010) present a model of recursive failure between power stations and an Internet network 
due to the interdependency of nodes within each network as well as across the two 
networks. 
 
Above examples emphasize how openness combined with certain network structures 
can induce failures that are more extensive than identified risks in a system design. To 
overcome these large-scale failures that are difficult to be pre-identified, instilling modularity 
into the network structure has been suggested to be crucial for resilient infrastructure 
networks. For example, a micro-grid, which is a module with a group of interconnected loads 
and distributed energy sources, can be disconnected from the entire grid system and 
operate as an island-mode in emergency conditions to maintain the power supply to local 
customers (Hussain, Bui, & Kim, 2019; Li, Shahidehpour, Aminifar, Alabdulwahab, & Al-
Turki, 2017). When the earthquake occurred in Fukushima in March 2011, power supply was 
stopped to the Sendai region, resulting in a three-day power outage. However, the Sendai 
micro-grid (a prototype grid project located in the Tohoku Fukushi University campus) could 
continuously supply power to several critical loads within the campus and provide full power 
service for few days following a blackout (Marnay et al., 2015).  
 
The problem of ―fit‖ of governance in infrastructure-dependent systems and how such 
a fit affects adaptive capacity of human-related nodes is also recognized within RE and 
related studies. In this genre of studies, the central nature is how resilience or macro-level 
performance of a system is affected by the alignment among the collaborative structure of 
social agents and their incentives and the physical structure of an infrastructure system 
being managed. For example, Cedergren et al. (2018) examined how the management and 
operation of a railroad system in Sweden are deregulated among multiple organizations and 
how this multi-actor setting creates unforeseen coordination problems among involved 
organizations during emergency situations due to misaligned incentives and consideration 
among them and the infrastructure characteristics.  Another example is Eisenberg et al. 
(2017), which showed that, by analyzing the betweenness of a power grid and emergency 
management organizations, the functional hubs of infrastructure and organization network 
do not always accord with each other. Based on this finding, they suggest ways to improve 
response to emergency by connecting key components of both networks. Thus, the capacity 
of human-related nodes in infrastructure networks to self-organize and adapt, including 
reactivating inactive nodes in times of crisis and improvising nodes or links when they fail to 
function in the system (Janssen et al., 2006) may depend on achieving the ―right fit‖ among 
structural and non-structural networks. 
 
To sum it up, system connectedness characteristics and the fit of governance with a 
system being governed are appreciated within RE because of their influence on adaptive 
margins and the macro-level outcomes of social interactions in infrastructure-dependent 
systems. Thus, a more integrative view on these connectedness-related features and how 
they are combined with other supporting conditions to promote adaptive capacity will be 
informative to RE. On this ground, we suggest inclusion of system connectedness 
characteristics and the fit of governance with a system being governed to RE principles. 
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Resilience Alliance scholars have long highlighted that constant learning and probing 
of the limits or boundaries of system operation are critical for dealing with uncertainty in the 
management of complex systems (Polasky, Carpenter, Folke, & Keeler, 2011). Hence, 
learning-focused management approaches such as adaptive management (Lee, 1993; 
Walters & Holling, 1990), adaptive co-management (Armitage, Marschke, & Plummer, 2008), 
and adaptive governance (Folke et al., 2005) have drawn much attention among researchers 
and practitioners as a method for putting resilience into practice. Core processes that are 
common to these approaches are monitoring, experimentation, and learning, i.e., learning-
by-doing (R. Biggs et al., 2012). Monitoring provides information about internal system states 
and external environment. Experimentation involves deliberate small changes to a system 
process or structure to observe and compare outcomes. Learning is the process of updating 
existing knowledge, governance goals, or management strategies based upon the results of 
monitoring and experimentation. These three processes work together to operationalize 
learning-by-doing. Note that learning can be influenced by the structure of connectivity 
among social nodes (discussed in Sub-section 3.2) because of its effect on the ease of 
knowledge transfer and opportunities for collaborative learning. However, the aspects of 
learning discussed in the current Sub-section are distinct in that the focus is on how learning 
can enable adaptive management (which is a way to deal with uncertainty) and how different 
types of learning can facilitate the process. 
 
3.3.1. Importance of Learning-By-Doing in RE 
 
Since a key goal of RE is to maintain system performance under both expected and 
unexpected disturbances, almost all of the existing principles for RE reflect some aspects of 
learning-by-doing (E. Hollnagel et al., 2006; Park et al., 2013). However, there are two subtle 
differences. First, whereas the role of experimentation is emphasized in the principles for 
social-ecological resilience, it is visibly absent in the principles for RE. This is because 
allowing deliberate small-scale failures or change is difficult, if not impossible, in most 
physical systems (although modeling can help to some degree) which provide benefit 
streams such as water, energy, and mobility that are basic to human wellbeing. This 
absence of experimentation contradicts how RE scholars have called for a paradigm shift 
from rigid fail-safe systems to more flexible safe-fail systems (Miller, Chester, & Muñoz-
Erickson, 2018; Park, Seager, & Rao, 2011).  
 
Second, there is relatively little discussion of the details of how learning should be 
encouraged to enhance adaptive capacity for resilience, i.e., what type of learning works and 
under what conditions. This gap has been noted in Hollnagel (2008) who points out that ―a 
concrete solution [on learning] requires careful consideration of which data to learn from, 
when to learn, and how learning should show itself in the organization‖ Even beyond this, it 
is important to see that different types of learning can exist, such as individual learning, 
social learning, single-loop learning, and double-loop learning (Argyris & Schön, 1978; Reed 
et al., 2010), and that these can have varying effects on how social groups self-organize in 
terms of adaptive capacity. Learning can be either individual or social depending on how the 
learning takes place (Armitage et al., 2008). Individual learning occurs when knowledge is 
obtained by an individual, not by a collective. Social learning occurs when learning takes 
place in a group through collaborative interactions and knowledge is internalized and 
stabilized at a group level (Chudek & Henrich, 2011). Learning-by-doing can also operate at 
two extents: single-loop and double-loop learning (Pahl-Wostl, 2009). Single-loop learning is 
about ―are we doing things right?‖ In single-loop learning, monitoring and experimentation 
take place in order to better meet existing goals. Double-loop learning concerns the question 
―are we doing the right things?‖ In double-loop learning, learning processes lead to updating 
and revising of underlying goals or assumptions. Empirical evidence shows that social 
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extreme disturbances in comparison to groups that focused on single-loop learning (Yu, 
Shin, Pérez, Anderies, & Janssen, 2016).  
 
In summary, RE regards learning to be central for building resilience and coping with 
uncertainty. RE explicitly mentions capacity for learning as one of cornerstones of resilient 
systems. Notions that can be further elaborated and emphasized by RE principles include: 
there are nuances among different types of learning and their varying effects; probing 
boundaries of system operation through deliberate management experiments and learning 
from the experience (i.e., adaptive management) can be helpful for building resilience; and 
promotion of social learning is important in nurturing adaptive capacity at a collective level.  
 
 
3.4. Manage for Complexity 
 
Awareness among actors of the properties of complex adaptive systems (Holland, 
2006) is important in nurturing the capacity of the actors to manage for resilience (R. Biggs 
et al., 2015). Properties of complex adaptive systems relevant to social-ecological systems 
include self-organization, the existence of alternate stable states and thresholds that 
separate them, rapid non-linear transitions between such alternate states, slow-varying 
variables that determine when critical feedbacks lead to alternate stable states, multi-level 
and multi-scale interactions, tradeoffs in resilience, and power-law scaling behavior (Folke, 
2006; Folke et al., 2010; Mitchell, 2009; Scheffer, 2009). The lack of appreciation among 
decision makers of these properties is often the reason why attempts are made to tightly 
regulate social-ecological systems under the idealistic assumption that these systems are 
tractable and predictable in the long-run. This kind of command-and-control approach is 
attributed as the key reason why self-organizing systems gradually lose resilience (Holling & 
Meffe, 1996).  
 
An important property of complexity is the potential presence of alternate stable 
states and the critical thresholds that mark rapid transitions between these states. Alternate 
stable states, which may exhibit hysteresis or not-easily-reversible changes, are a hallmark 
of ecological resilience and arise as a result of a system‘s self-organization into qualitatively 
different configurations. Classic examples of resilience are derived from this phenomenon, 
e.g., critical transitions between clear and eutrophic states of lakes and grassy and shrubby 
states of rangelands (Folke et al., 2004). The existence of thresholds or tipping points, the 
locations of non-linear transitions between those states, has long been recognized in 
complex systems modeling, but it is still challenging to predict such points in real-world 
systems. As a result, scholars have sought to identify early warning signs that indicate that a 
system may be approaching such a point, and recent work has generated a variety of 
signals that have consistently appeared in a variety of complex systems (Dakos, Carpenter, 
Nes, Scheffer, & Dakos, 2015). Several of those indicators are collectively referred to as 
―critical slowing down‖ (Scheffer et al., 2009) and can be statistically identified as increased 
autocorrelation, slower recovery, increased variance, flickering, and skewness in system 
states after small perturbations. 
 
The concepts of multi-scale and multi-level processes and panarchy also indicate 
how complex social-ecological systems can be (Allen, Angeler, Garmestani, Gunderson, & 
Holling, 2014; Brian Walker, Holling, Carpenter, & Kinzig, 2004). More often than not, these 
systems are managed with a narrow scope, i.e., at a particular scale or level of dynamics 
that is of interest to managers. However, complexity can be much higher in reality because 
these systems are connected to processes and feedbacks that operate at other scales and 
levels (e.g., global system processes, household-level processes, etc.). These feedbacks 
can originate at both higher and lower scales and can lead to surprises and unintended 
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cross-scale interactions in determining outcomes in social-ecological systems, i.e., how a 
dynamics at a focal scale and level is shaped by processes operating at the level above or 
below. A classic example is how the long-term dynamics of a forest ecosystem (cycle of 
destruction by forest-wide fire, revegetation, and maturation into a dense forest) is influenced 
by the memories from above (surviving species found in the wider landscape) and the 
revolts from below (patch-level burning by wildfire) (Allen et al., 2014; L. H. Gunderson & 
Holling, 2001).  
 
It is also important to realize that tradeoffs among different vulnerabilities can occur 
in social-ecological systems as a result of design choices. Decisions to alter system design 
to reduce vulnerability to a particular disturbance regime may lead to amplified vulnerabilities 
to disturbances in other domains because of the interplay between design and self-
organization (Csete & Doyle, 2002; Janssen & Anderies, 2007). One of the underlying 
questions of social-ecological resilience thinking asks ―resilience of what to what‖ (Carpenter 
et al., 2001), and this implicitly acknowledges that strategies to increase the resilience (or 
reduce the vulnerability) of a particular aspect of social-ecological system to a specific set of 
disturbances may cause the system to be more vulnerable in other ways. Thus, 
vulnerabilities cannot be eliminated; they are merely shifted around different domains with 
design choice (Anderies, 2015). This notion is particularly true in light of the previous 
principle of multi-scalar feedbacks and interactions; focusing on the short-term resilience of a 
system output over narrow spatial scale has been cited as particularly problematic for losing 
long-term resilience (Carpenter, Brock, Folke, van Nes, & Scheffer, 2015; Chelleri, Waters, 
Olazabal, & Minucci, 2015).  
 
Further, phenomena from various natural, social, or engineered systems have shown 
to exhibit power-law distributions and scaling behavior: a relatively small number of 
extremely large-scale events, a very large number of events with a wide range of diversity in 
impact or size, and self-similarity or scale-free pattern in the size distributions of such events 
(Mitchell, 2009). Although such phenomena are very different in nature and origin (e.g., 
income distribution, disasters, river networks, drainage infrastructure networks, etc.), the 
power-law is a regularity that can be held to hold among them (Levin, 1998). Power-law 
distributions mean that such phenomena do not have meaningful averages, signifying that 
there will be low-probability, large-scale events that are inherently unpredictable. Several 
generative mechanisms have been proposed to explain power-law distributions, including 
positive feedback loops or preferential attachment (i.e., ―rich gets richer‖ process), self-
organized criticality (i.e., how a system drives itself over time to a critical state beyond which 
outbursts of activity occur), and highly-optimized tolerance (i.e., how system vulnerabilities 
are shifted around different domains as a result of fine-tuning system design) (Carlson & 
Doyle, 2002; Mitchell, 2009). 
 
 
3.4.1. Importance of Managing for Complexity in RE 
 
Complexity of socio-technical system is well recognized by RE and related studies 
(Lloyd‘s Register Foundation, 2015). The multi-scale and multi-level nature of such systems 
involved in risk management is at the core of RE. For example, Rasmussen (Jens 
Rasmussen, 1997) and subsequent studies (Costella et al., 2009) highlight that multiple 
organizational levels and different disciplinary perspectives or unit of analysis are often 
involved in socio-technical system dynamics. Feedback loops or interactions across several 
such scales and levels in a system imply that one cannot fully comprehend, anticipate or 
prevent system accidents. In line with this notion is Normal Accident Theory (Perrow, 1981, 
1999), a well-known concept in the safety science community. Based on the analysis of 
organizational features of those involved in a major nuclear accident, Normal Accident 




This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
 
anticipated in some types of technological systems because of two system properties: 
complex interactions and tightly coupled nature. According to this theory, complex 
interactions in a system are driven by factors such as the presence of multi-functionality 
components, specialized knowledge of front-end staff that limit their awareness of inter-
dependencies, physical proximity of components; and unfamiliar or unintended feedback 
loops that make analysis difficult. Tight coupling occurs when there is little leeway in terms of 
time system processes, little variation in the sequence of system processing, little buffer or 
slack is available in resources and equipment, and little flexibility and redundancy in system 
design, components, and personnel, among others (Perrow, 1999; Shrivastava et al., 2009). 
Typically, tight coupling is exacerbated when only efficiency is pursued, making systems 
management locked in a rigidity trap (L. Gunderson & Holling, 2002). On a different note, a 
recently study on urban water systems security also showed that focusing entirely on local 
level resilience and ignoring interactions across multiple scales can lead to an incomplete 
analysis of system dynamics (E. H. Krueger, Borchardt, Jawitz, & Rao, 2020; E. Krueger, 
Rao, & Borchardt, 2019). Only when multi-level and multi-scale dynamics are considered, a 
more complete characterization of urban water system dynamics is possible in terms of 
security, resilience, and sustainability.   
 
Also relevant to RE and safety and risk sciences are difficult tradeoffs (often between 
safety objectives and economic objectives) in situations characterized by high stakes and 
complexity. Such tradeoffs exist not only between costs and risks stemming from different 
engineering design choices but also among different risks or vulnerabilities (Aven, 2017; 
Carlson & Doyle, 2002; David Woods, Schenk, & Allen, 2008). Risk or vulnerability tradeoffs 
can emerge through interplays between engineering design and self-organization in the 
long-run (Ishtiaque, Sangwan, & Yu, 2017). Logan et al. (Logan et al., 2018) makes this 
point clear by illustrating that quantitative risk assessments around hard-adaptive measures 
that ignore behavioral feedbacks (e.g., increased economic activities on floodplains) and 
long-term changes in natural system states (e.g., increased land-sea level difference) can 
lead to an inaccurate assessment of flood risk in the long-run. Another case in point is how 
an extended period of drought caused a change in operation rules of a reservoir 
infrastructure to put greater operational focus on water conservation than flood prevention 
(Di Baldassarre, Martinez, Kalantari, & Viglione, 2017). This study argues that while such a 
change might have reduced risks to droughts, it can also increase risks to extreme flood 
events.  
 
In contrast, there is little discussion within RE about the potential for alternate stable 
states and critical transitions between them, presumably because these are thought to be 
irrelevant to the built or technological components and organizations directly involved in their 
daily operations and management. However, if and when time scale of analysis is extended 
to decadal, centennial or longer time levels, aspects of alternate stable states and critical 
transitions may matter to infrastructure-dependent systems (e.g., Anderies, 2006; Kuil, Carr, 
Viglione, Prskawetz, & Blöschl, 2016). For example, Anderies (Anderies, 2006) uses a 
mathematical model to explain why an agricultural society that constructed, expanded, and 
heavily relied on a complex network of irrigation infrastructure might have collapsed in the 
past. He argues that the presence of water infrastructure might have caused a path 
dependency or lock-in towards continued expansion of canals and greater reliance on the 
infrastructure to increase and stabilize agricultural production in order to keep up with 
increasing population. This might have created two alternate stable states (functional vs. 
collapsed) and caused gradual erosion of the resilience of the functional regime, making the 
system especially vulnerable to extended droughts. In infrastructure-dependent systems, an 
infrastructure might induce a path dependency or lock-in towards alternate stable states and 
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In summary, different features of complexity are acknowledged within RE and 
regarded as a chief cause of irreducible uncertainty in the dynamics of infrastructure-
dependent systems. Notions about these features motivate the significance of RE and why 
the perspectives of RE can complement the approach of traditional safety management. As 
such, awareness among decision makers about the complex adaptive systems nature 
(Holland, 2006) of infrastructure-dependent systems is important to nurturing safety culture 
and organizational ability for resilience. On this ground, we suggest that RE stands to gain 
from incorporating into its general principles aspects about complex interactions (multi-scale 
and multi-level) and tradeoffs in risks or vulnerability stemming from design choices and self-
organization. However, aspects of alternate stable states, which are integral to social-
ecological systems resilience, seem to be of less relevance to RE and, thus, we think that 




3.5. Foster Social Capital  
 
The resilience literature refers to social capital in several inter-related ways—as a 
form of capital, as trust and leadership, as a social network, and as participation (R. Biggs et 
al., 2015; Brondizio, Ostrom, & Young, 2009). These features of social organization facilitate 
cooperation for mutual benefits and, thus, enhance the ability of groups to solve collective 
action problems (E Ostrom & Ahn, 2003; Putnam, 1993) and gain the resources essential for 
restoring services and meeting the needs of disaster survivors (Mayunga, 2007). Social 
capital can also be understood as the positive effects and outcomes achieved through the 
development and nurturing of relationships and interactions among various individuals,  
social groups, organizations, and entities within a community (Aldrich & Meyer, 2015; Cutter, 
Burton, & Emrich, 2010) that are derived through formal and informal ties or networks that 
form before, during, or after disturbances (Aldrich, 2010). The degree of cooperation and 
collaboration resulting from these ties partially determines the extent to which individuals and 
organizations are able to collectively enhance social capital (Mayunga, 2007). Such social 
ties can take three forms: bonding, bridging, or linking (Aldrich & Meyer, 2015; Hawkins & 
Maurer, 2010; Woolcock, 2002).  Previous research has defined and measured these ties in 
various ways and some of the more widely applied definitions, such as those offered by 
Woodcock (2002) and Nakagawa and Shaw (2004), describe the types of actors and how 
their interactions serve to address a diverse range of post-disaster issues.  They, along with 
other scholars, define bonding as ties that exist between familiar individuals and 
organizations that facilitate the existence of a strong sense of community. These ties often 
exist between an individual‘s close relatives, friends, or those one frequently interacts with in 
a community such as a neighbor, teacher, or co-worker (Molinas, 2002; Nakagawa & Shaw, 
2004). Bridging includes social capital stemming from established networks between more 
distant individuals, such as acquaintances, that are often dissimilar in terms of their 
geographic location or socio-demographic characteristics, but still have comparable social 
status and values (Aldrich & Meyer, 2015; Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004; Newell, Tansley, & 
Huang, 2004). Previous studies suggest that these types of collaborations can enhance 
social capital through the diversification of information availability, resources, and services 
that may be needed in the aftermath of a disaster (Andrew, Arlikatti, Siebeneck, Pongponrat, 
& Jaikampan, 2016). Lastly, linking refers to the establishment of alliances or relationships 
between individuals or communities and formal organizations such as public agencies, 
private entities, and non-profit stakeholders in positions of power or authority (Molinas, 2002; 
Woolcock, 2002).  
 
The social capacity derived through these social network-based capital is essential in 
the enhancement of social-ecological resilience to disasters, as these relationships provide 
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available through other means (W Neil Adger, Hughes, Folke, Carpenter, & Rockström, 
2005). Adger (N. W. Adger, 2003) argues that networks and capacities fostered through 
these ties promote a shared management of social capital, which in-turn enhances the ability 
of individuals and communities to coordinate and share resources needed when carrying out 
mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery activities. As such, social capital can be 
thought of a key enabler of the ability to meet ones needs and access resources by 
leveraging relationships. In this sense, one could argue that social capital promotes 
response diversity and redundancy in social systems, i.e., such relationships allow disaster-
affected people to achieve the same function (meeting their needs) even when individuals do 
not have their own resources. 
 
Trust and leadership facilitate cooperative behavior and reduce the cost of working 
together. As a result, they enable innovation and adaptive decision-making (Gutiérrez, 
Hilborn, & Defeo, 2011). All resilience-building principles discussed in this paper that relate 
to governance—not just in the title, like polycentricity, but also learning-by-doing, building 
connectivity and diversity in decision-making—require strong leadership for shaping desired 
outcomes. Leadership facilitates involvement and improves decision-making. Olsson et 
al.(2004) discuss the importance of leadership in the transformation of social-ecological 
systems, where transformation is a radical change to a more sustainable regime.  
Experimentation, whether adaptive or transformative, requires trust and leadership (Cundill, 
2010).  
 
Institutional arrangements are also part of social capital. Institutional arrangements 
are formal and informal rules of the game that guide what actions are allowed or prohibited, 
by whom, and under what conditions during human interactions with one another (North, 
1990). They are crafted and used by human society because they bring structure and 
predictability to such interactions, thereby reducing the transaction cost of exchange among 
parties and supporting functioning of societal systems (ibid). Further, institutional 
arrangements are also developed to govern how humans use technological and ecological 
systems that are shared by many, e.g., rules for operating transportation road networks, 
levees and reservoirs (Anderies, Janssen, & Schlager, 2016; Yu et al., 2015; Yu, Sangwan, 
Sung, Chen, & Merwade, 2017). 
 
 
3.5.1. Importance of Social Capital in RE 
 
Several studies related to RE acknowledge and discuss the beneficial roles of trust, 
leadership, or social networks for resilience (Aldrich, 2012; Costella et al., 2009; Davoudi, 
Brooks, & Mehmood, 2013). The role and importance of institutional arrangements for the 
rapid recovery of infrastructure-dependent systems is also noted within RE (Cedergren et al., 
2018). However, the consideration of such social capital elements tend to be scattered 
across the literature and are yet to be explicitly included as part of RE principles. 
 
One primary goal of RE is to improve the safety and functionality of the various 
systems within a given environment to withstand the effect of chronic or sudden adverse 
events (D. D. Woods & Hollnagel, 2017). The environment, regardless of scale, is comprised 
of various systems that are often interdependent with one another. While RE places 
emphasis on the restoration of various systems and infrastructure in response to disruptions, 
such as disasters, it also recognizes that these processes are closely tied to the human and 
social systems that are embedded within the environment (Norris, Stevens, Pfefferbaum, 
Wyche, & Pfefferbaum, 2008).  Within emergency management and hazards literature, 
Murphy (2007) proposed that social capital, which can be derived from networks of strong 
and weak ties, is a vital resource for improving community resilience. Wickes et al. (2015) 
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vulnerability, is associated with perceived community resilience. Manifested through specific 
indicators such as associational relationships, community belonging, social norms, and trust, 
social capital provides a mechanism for community members to become active agents in 
organizing their activities and gaining access to resources (W. N. Adger, 2000; Barton, 
1969). The capacity of a location to withstand the adverse impacts of disaster is highly 
dependent on the ―networked social communities and lifeline systems‖ existing within that 
community…‖ (Godschalk, 2003). To that end, linkages between various social networks 
play a critical role in the strengthening of social capital and the resilience of the physical 
environment within a community.  
 
In understanding the effects of social capital on the resilience of an infrastructure-
dependent system, we see multiple causal connections.  Many of the other principles for 
influencing resilience affect social capital.  For instance, the multiple perspectives 
engendered by increasing diversity—through strengthening social networks, expanding on 
diversity of knowledge and ways of knowing, or engaging diverse stakeholder groups—can 
build social capital.  Likewise, increasing connectivity through bonding and bridging 
relationships in a network can build social capital.  Broadening participation, in general, may 
also increase social capital (Cundill, 2010). Strengthening the social capital of individuals, 
communities, organizations, and stakeholders can also introduce redundancy into social and 
physical systems, thereby enhancing disaster resilience (Tierney, 2008). Building on the 
ideas mentioned previously, broadened participation increases diversity of perspectives and 
builds knowledge. All of these are seen as enhancing resilience (R. Biggs et al., 2015).   
 
At the same time, social capital facilitates other resilience-building principles. Social 
capital builds the trust between groups of people that is required to allow for experimentation 
and learning-by-doing (N. W. Adger, 2003).  Similarly, accountability increases trust and 
social capital through the building of legitimacy, and characteristics are essential for effective 
polycentric governance (R. Biggs et al., 2015). In short, social capital facilitates collective 
action which in turn improves many of the other variables—connectivity of groups of people, 
broadening diversity of knowledge, world views, and alternative mental models. These 
variables undergird the foundation for polycentric governance systems which will be 
discussed in the next subsection. 
 
In a nutshell, various elements of social capital reduce the cost of collaboration or 
exchange among actors within and across multiple levels of organizations working towards a 
related task. Since prevention and recovery of many system accidents and failures often 
involve multiple stakeholders‘ participation and collaboration, social capital can play a central 
role in promoting system resilience through facilitation of such coordinated group actions. 
Furthermore, given that one of the key characteristics of RE is its focus on human 
organizational ability for variability management, social capital with its positive effects on 
collaborative group actions is highly relevant to RE. On this ground, we suggest formal 




3.6. Polycentric Governance  
 
A form of governance structure termed polycentricity is thought to be an important 
contextual condition relevant to system resilience (R. Biggs et al., 2015). Polycentric 
governance systems are characterized by multiple centers of decision making which operate 
semi-independently but with the ability to interact and affect one another (Carlisle & Gruby, 
2017). These centers operate at multiple levels, leading to a nested, overlapping structure 
with horizontal (at the same scale) and vertical (across scale) ties. It has been suggested 
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decentralized or community-based governance (Imperial, 1999). Most importantly, the 
components of a polycentric governance system are able to consider each other and react, 
both cooperatively and competitively (V. Ostrom, Tiebout, & Warren, 1961). Polycentric 
governance systems have been lauded in the social-ecological resilience literature for a 
variety of reasons, with much attention paid to: the ability of polycentric systems to adapt to 
change, the ―goodness of institutional fit‖ provided by polycentric systems, and the ―safe-fail‖ 
nature of semi-redundant governance systems (R. Biggs et al., 2015).  
 
 
3.6.1 Importance of Polycentric Governance in RE 
 
The role and importance of governance is noted by the risk literature, so much so 
that there is a strand of research called risk governance (Van Asselt & Renn, 2011). A 
particular structure of governance, termed polycentric governance, is also recognized by 
some conceptual studies within RE. These studies refer to the concept as polycentric control 
architecture and acknowledge the beneficial effects of the architecture on the adaptive 
operation of infrastructure systems under uncertainty (Branlat & Woods, 2010; D. D. Woods 
& Branlat, 2010). These studies view polycentric control architecture as the presence of 
multiple centers of control that are interdependent and situated at different scales or levels of 
an overall system, each of which operates with some degree of autonomy. This allows 
various decision centers to independently set and adapt their goals and associated plans 
and make decisions by taking the relationships with other centers into consideration (ibid). 
As a result, polycentric architecture facilitates better ―fit‖ or matching between control and 
local context through empowerment of local control centers.  
 
This type of control architecture is likely to be effective under disaster situations 
because of the need to match disaster responses to local context, a high degree of 
uncertainty and chaos that require autonomous adaptations (Forsyth & Evans, 2013), and 
the need to coordinate numerous control units at local level over wider geographic and 
jurisdictional extents and the involvement of control units at higher levels of organization (D. 
D. Woods & Shattuck, 2000). Further, polycentricity allows each control center to create and 
maintain some margin of maneuverability in ways that reflect its own circumstances, a 
buffering cushion of actions and resources that help each subsystem as well as the 
overarching system to continue functioning in the face of unexpected situations (David 
Woods & Branlat, 2011). Failure to maintain margin leaves the overall system with little 
resourcefulness when prompt responses are needed to deal with acute, low-probability 
events.  
 
Polycentric governance matters to the resilience of infrastructure-dependent systems 
because such systems are often part of polycentric nexus of interconnected semi-
autonomous organizations, engineering infrastructures and natural processes. As Wood and 
Branlat (D. D. Woods & Branlat, 2010) suggest, centralized control of such a system can be 
problematic because of the risk of over-homogenizing responses to system components that 
are disparate (i.e., the problem of fit) and the risk of information and decision bottlenecks in 
the apex control center in times of crisis. Fully decentralized control can be also problematic 
because of the risk of system components operating in silos and the risk of missing links in 
vertical and horizontal interactions that can prove to be fatal in times of crisis. Polycentric 
control or governance structure offers a middle-ground between the two architectures and 
contributes to resilience due to its advantages in matching governance levels to the scale of 
the problem and in inducing self-correcting mechanisms through overlaps and diversity in 
responses (R. Biggs et al., 2015). Of course, these strengths of polycentricity come with 
related costs (Schoon, Robards, Meek, & Galaz, 2015). The primary challenge is in 
balancing the benefits of redundancy with the costs of this duplicative effort. There are also 
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These costs come both from the added redundancy and focus on place-based decision-
making within a center of decision-making.  
 
Polycentric governance affects resilience in other ways too.  Like the earlier 
discussion about social capital, polycentric governance both affects and is affected by other 
resilience-enabling principles. As with building social capital, polycentric governance 
facilitates learning and experimentation, enabling failures in one sphere of governance to 
rebuild off of the experience of other spheres at similar levels or others.  It provides a 
mechanism, similar to federalism, in that multiple experiments can be tried, and successes 
emulated (Schoon et al., 2015). In effect, it adds in redundancy to minimize failure and 
correct mistakes that are inevitable in the process of governance in complex systems. This, 
in effect, provides a means of increasing response diversity.  Additionally, in its structure, 
polycentric governance improves connectivity while building modularity. 
 
In summary, although the notion of polycentric structure of governance is not 
widespread in RE, it is certainly noted and discussed in the field. Polycentricity is relevant to 
RE given its advantages in matching governance levels to the scale of the problem and in 
inducing self-correcting mechanisms through overlaps and diversity in responses. Because 
of the integral role of polycentricity in supporting other conditions related to adaptive 
capacity, promotion of polycentricity in an infrastructure-dependent system presents a strong 
case for inclusion into RE principles.    
 
4. IMPLICATIONS FOR PRINCIPLES FOR RESILIENCE 
ENGINEERING 
 
Our comparative analysis of the resilience-enhancing principles in the preceding 
section reveals the following points about the state-of-the-art in RE and the broader risk and 
safety-related field in comparison to the social-ecological systems resilience community. The 
importance of redundancy (response diversity) and learning and adaptation are both well 
recognized and explicitly mentioned as part of resilience-enhancing principles. The effects of 
different system connectedness characteristics (openness, modularity, and coupling of 
networks) and different forms of social capital (trust, participation, and collaborative social 
network) are well recognized and discussed within the field, but they are yet to be clearly 
packaged into RE principles. A similar pattern is observed with regards to polycentric 
governance, functional diversity, experimentation and social learning, the role of institutional 
arrangements, and the problem of fit involving social networks and governance. These 
aspects are noted by RE and the broader risk and safety sciences but yet to clearly appear 
as RE principles. Also, how all these various conditions collectively fit together to bring about 
resilience has been elusive in the field.  
 
How can the lessons and the opportunities presented by this comparative analysis be 
applied to better inform future RE studies and practices? We contend that organizing a more 
comprehensive set of resilience-enhancing principles that incorporate the results of our 
analysis can be useful in this regard. The rationale is that the conditions discussed here are 
consistently suggested to be relevant for resilience because of their positive influence on the 
adaptive capacity of social systems (R. Biggs et al., 2015; Ö. Bodin, 2017; R. Bodin, 2006; 
Carpenter et al., 2012; Polasky et al., 2011; D. D. Woods & Branlat, 2010). As a start and 
building on the pioneering work of RE and Resilience Alliance theorists, the following 
tentative messages for RE principles emerge from our work: 
 
 Recognize that system context matters (P1). An infrastructure and its operating 
organization in isolation cannot fully reflect resilience—they are embedded within 
broader social, ecological, and technological contexts that are constantly in flux with 
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and failure to account for feedbacks involving broader systems are a cause of many 
of the recurring problems in infrastructure-dependent systems. Thus, system 
boundaries under consideration should not only cover the focal infrastructure and 
organizations directly responsible for operation, but should also reflect linkages with 
other technical networks, natural processes, and linked user and governance 
organizations at levels above or below the focal organizational scale. Further, this 
principle warns against blueprint panacea types of interventions or thinking, i.e., 
technical designs or regulatory designs (design of rules, regulations, and work 
procedures) that work in one setting do not necessarily mean they will also work in 
other contextual settings. 
 
 Foster social capital (P2). Social capital includes intangible, but important, group-
shared assets such as trust, broad participation, collaborative social networks, and 
formal and informal institutional arrangements. Social capital matters for resilience 
because of the beneficial effects on the links that connect social-to-social or social-to-
physical (built or natural) nodes. These effects take on various forms, including 
capacity for reactivating inactive nodes in times of crisis, capacity for improvising and 
adapting nodes or links when they fail to function, and protocols of interaction that 
increase the predictability (hence, reduce the cost) of such interactions. Thus, social 
capital enables infrastructure-dependent systems to extend capacity, self-organize, 
and still function when disturbances push them to the brink of or beyond the limits of 
their designed robustness.  
 
 Maintain diversity (P3). Redundancy (response diversity) and functional diversity 
matter for resilience because of their insurance and complementary effects, 
respectively. Systems with high levels of redundancy and functional diversity are 
generally more resilient than ones that are low in these two attributes. However, too 
much heterogeneity (high levels of redundancy or functional diversity) can also lead 
to inefficiencies, which may undermine adaptive capacity. It is also important to note 
that redundancy and functional diversity not only exist in physical components but 
also in social capital or regulatory infrastructure (e.g., redundancy or diversity in 
institutional arrangements and social ties) and human capital (e.g., diversity in actors‘ 
backgrounds and experience). 
 
 Manage connectivity (P4). Connectivity enhances resilience by facilitating 
exchange of knowledge and resources and collaborative interactions among social 
nodes, all of which can contribute to rapid recovery after disruptions and adaptive 
capacity to deal with unexpected disturbances. However, a caveat is that an overly 
connected system can also be vulnerable because disturbances can spread more 
quickly across built or cyber nodes and because of potential homogenization or loss 
of diversity in social nodes. Context matters for specific aspects of connectivity 
structure ideal for resilience. Openness in connectivity is generally beneficial to 
resilience when connectivity concerns exchange of knowledge, resources for 
recovery, or cooperative relationships. Modularity in connectivity is better for 
resilience when it concerns functional interdependency, i.e., situations where an input 
critical to the functioning of each node depends on an output from or the state of 
another. Modularity is also better for resilience when connectivity involves diffusion 
processes that are potentially harmful (e.g., epidemic disease, software viruses, 
erroneous information, etc.). 
 
 Encourage learning-by-doing (P5). Learning contributes to resilience because of its 
beneficial role in decision-making under uncertainty. Important features of learning 
that should be noted more by RE are experimentation and social learning. 




This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
 
raising and for probing the boundaries or limits of system resilience. Social learning is 
a type of learning that occurs when knowledge is gained and shared collectively by a 
group. Social learning is critical for the updating of institutional arrangements and 
social goals and underlying assumptions. Experimentation and social learning jointly 
work for building resilience. 
 
 Embrace polycentric control (P6). Polycentric structure in governance or system 
control means that there are multiple decision units operating in a specific geographic 
area or level of jurisdiction, each of which operates with some degree of autonomy. 
Each unit may be connected horizontally with other units to work on a common issue 
or interact vertically with other units that are nested within a hierarchical governance 
system. Polycentric governance has been considered a key principle for building 
resilience because of its advantages in matching governance levels to the scale of 
the problem and in encouraging self-correcting mechanisms through redundancy and 
diversity in governance structures.  
 
 Address the problem of fit (P7). The problem of fit pertains to how well the 
structure of a collaborative social network aligns with the structure of the built or 
natural system being governed (fit involving social networks) or how well the design 
of institutional arrangements matches with the scale or nature of the problem being 
addressed (fit involving institutional arrangements). A lack of such a fit can lead to 
problems and erosions in resilience because it means that a governance system only 
manages a part of the physical world or does not fully account for the extents of 
ecological processes or technical aspects. A high level of fit can enable social nodes 
to better coordinate with one another and appropriately respond to a problem. 
 
 Manage for complexity (P8). A step towards building resilience requires a shift in 
actors‘ underlying mental models that acknowledge the complex adaptive systems 
nature of an infrastructure-dependent system being governed. Approaches based on 
the linear, reductionist thinking is often a root cause of erosions in resilience. 
Relevant sub-principles are as follows. 
 
Consider multiple scales and levels and their linkages. It is important to understand 
how the focal scale of interest is linked to other scales, e.g., approaches that 
increase a localized system‘s efficiency and robustness in a short-time scale might 
increase long-term vulnerability to processes that operate at a larger spatial or longer 
time scale. It is also important to understand how the focal level of a scale influences 
the levels above or below, e.g., approaches that reduce vulnerability at household 
level might undermine resilience at community level. 
 
Understand robustness-vulnerability tradeoffs. While engineering for robustness is 
certainly important and required, it is also important to realize that enhancing 
robustness (or reducing vulnerability) to particular types of shocks can lead to 
increased vulnerabilities in other domains because of self-organization. That is, 
vulnerabilities cannot be eliminated. They are merely shifted across domains. Such 
robustness-vulnerability tradeoffs are an inherent feature of systems governed by 
regulatory feedback controls. Thus, social systems should nurture capacity for 
detecting and navigating through robustness-vulnerability tradeoffs that inevitably 
appear as risk profiles change. 
 
Pay attention to interdependencies or coupling of multiple infrastructure networks. 
Interdependencies of infrastructure networks can take various forms, including 
physical (the state of each infrastructure depends on the output from or the state of 
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in close proximity), cyber (the state of an infrastructure depends on information 
generated by information infrastructure), and logical (two infrastructures affect the 
state of each other via human decisions or social processes). These 
interdependencies affect resilience because of their influence on how localized 
failures might cascade through the system. 
 
Equally important is understanding how these principles work collectively to influence 
resilience. Implementing any one principle in isolation will likely not lead to increased 
resilience of infrastructure-dependent systems (R. Biggs et al., 2015). In this respect, we 
contend that the principles listed above can be thought of as a set of enabling or second-
order conditions under which the first-order system abilities associated with resilience 
emerge. Although exploratory, we suggest that the following conceptual model (Fig. 1) can 
be useful to illustrate potential relationships among various RE principles and that these tend 
to be consistent with the notions and findings from a variety of disciplines (R. Biggs et al., 
2015; Francis & Bekera, 2014; SRA, 2018).  
 
Fig. 1. Interrelationships among the principles towards building resilience in infrastructure-dependent 
systems. The figure shows a plausible set of interconnected second-order conditions through which 
three first-order system abilities for resilience (robustness or absorptive capacity, adaptive capacity, 
and restorative capacity) emerge. 
 
As can be seen in Fig. 1, high levels of trust among social actors and openness in 
social connectivity provide an environment where active stakeholder participation or co-
management occurs. Such participation is a precondition for learning-by-doing, especially in 
the form of social learning. However, participation alone is not sufficient for effective learning 
to arise. When participation occurs in combination with functional diversity in social actors, 
more effective learning becomes possible. When this type of learning occurs systematically 
through cycles of experimentation and social learning, knowledge and experience are 
attained at group or collective level. This enables groups to further accumulate social 
capital—trust, broad participation, formal and informal rules, shared goals and underlying 
assumptions, collaborative social ties, among others. The resulting gain in social capital not 
only promotes cooperation (which is critical for social capacity for adaptation and fast 
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bonding) but also feeds back to reinforce learning by encouraging greater participation. 
Participation is also a precondition for implementing polycentric governance. Modular 
governance structures associated with polycentricity generate overlaps or redundancy in the 
services and functions of governance. This redundancy in the governance layer enhances 
resilience because when a governance unit at a particular level fails, vertically-linked broader 
levels of governance or horizontally-linked units at the same level can step in and provide 
support. Next, polycentric governance and learning-by-doing act together to provide an 
environment where potential problems of fit between governance design or social network 
and technological system being governed can be proactively detected and addressed. What 
emerge holistically from these dependencies among principles are more adaptive capacity 
for the unknown and unknowable and more capacity for rapid recovery following great 
stress. Of course, the full manifestation of the pathways described is not an inevitable result 
of any of the first-order principles described above. For example, again drawing on work in 
cities as infrastructure-dependent systems, we see that stakeholder engagement in agenda-
setting initiatives is as power-laden as any contested process (Bryson & Slotterback, 2016; 
Dahl, 1989; Jacobs, 2014). Therefore, scholars of resilience must seek openness, trust, and 
learning-by-doing with a constant eye to participatory justice in negotiated system dynamics.  
 
With respect to the built system or technological part, absorptive capacity (and 
hence, robustness) can be imbued into physical infrastructure through engineering design 
based on a probabilistic risk assessment and some acceptable level of risk to a set of 
anticipated hazards, e.g., design of a levee system protecting a riverine city based on past 
records. Absorptive capacity can be further enhanced by instilling redundancy and 
modularity in the connectedness of physical components, e.g., improved engineered safety 
features of a production system. Note that these properties of redundancy and modularity in 
physical components are distinct from redundancy and modularity in governance and social 
networks (which, in most part, contribute to adaptive and restorative capacities). 
Furthermore, with shifting risk profiles under the changing environment and society, new 
risks and vulnerabilities emerge and may make existing design no longer effective or even a 
source of the problem itself (Carlson & Doyle, 2002; D. D. Woods, 2016). Thus, capacity for 
timely and effective risk analysis, which includes assessment and characterization of 
emergent risks, risk communication, and risk management (e.g., updating of engineering 
design in a timely manner to respond to changes in risk), becomes extremely important for 
maintaining absorptive capacity. Organizational adaptive capacity can facilitate a cycle of 
continuous risk analysis to effectively navigate through such tradeoffs in risk, i.e., ability to 
anticipate and take proactive measures to engineered systems to update absorptive 
capacity. Finally, the principle for recognizing that system context matters and the principle 
for managing for complexity contribute to all other principles. These two principles facilitate 
actors to better appreciate other principles and to more effectively implement them.  
Putting all these pieces together, we have portrayed a more encompassing map on 
how the first-order abilities described by the R4 Framework (absorptive capacity, adaptive 
capacity, and capacity for fast recovery) and the four cornerstones of RE (abilities for 
monitoring, learning, adapting, and anticipation) and their variants may be facilitated by co-
occurrences and dependencies among various supporting conditions reflected in the RE 
principles we organized. This second-order insight provides a clearer picture of plausible 
conditions under which infrastructure-dependent systems can self-organize to develop more 
general resilience.  
 
 





This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
 
Maintaining the performance of infrastructure-dependent systems under known and 
unknown threats is a grand challenge. Addressing this challenge requires enhancement of 
general resilience in these systems, which is about building capacity to deal with a broad 
range of shocks, including unexpected and extreme ones (Folke, 2016). Hence, we argue 
that better understanding of general principles that promote resilience in a universal way and 
bringing them to the forefront of Resilience Engineering (RE) can make a valuable 
contribution to meeting this important goal.  
 
There is a growing body of work about the principles for resilience in both RE and 
social-ecological system studies (R. Biggs et al., 2015; Lloyd‘s Register Foundation, 2015). 
Although some of the principles do overlap, there are distinct differences in the two lines of 
research. By comparing and synthesizing the knowledge developed in them, we made some 
tentative suggestions about a more comprehensive set of resilience-enhancing principles for 
RE. We examined whether there are principles currently widely accepted in social-ecological 
system resilience that might benefit the aim and ambitions within RE and whether and how 
such principles are currently discussed in RE and safety sciences. We took this approach 
because of the partly self-organizing nature of infrastructure-dependent systems. Thus, the 
field of RE stands to gain from incorporating the principles-related insights from the field of 
social-ecological system resilience (which focuses on the dynamics of complex self-
organized systems). Specifically, our approach has been to organize scattered discussions 
about supporting conditions linked to basic system or organizational qualities related to 
resilience and delineate how such conditions are dependent on one another and collectively 
fit together to engender resilience. The following tentative propositions for RE principles 
emerged from our comparative analysis: (P1) recognize that system context matters, (P2) 
foster social capital, (P3) maintain diversity, (P4) manage connectivity, (P5) encourage 
learning-by-doing, (P6) embrace polycentric control, (P7) address the problem of fit or match 
the scale of a problem to that of governance and collaborative networks, and (P8) manage 
for complexity by considering multiple scales and levels involved in system dynamics, 
potential robustness-vulnerability tradeoffs, and interdependencies among multiple 
infrastructure networks. We also argued that these principles do not occur in isolation and 
that they tend to influence one another. For example, presence of a polycentric control can 
affect diversity, connectivity, and the problem of fit in a system because of potential overlaps 
and nestedness in involved governance units. In this spirit, we presented an exploratory 
conceptual model (Fig. 1) of potential interlinkages among the proposed RE principles and 
how they may operate in combination with one another and with risk analysis to engender 
general resilience.  
 
We also suggest multiple ways forward for future research. Future studies should 
investigate how the RE principles can be applied in diverse contexts. At the most basic level, 
there is a need for identifying practical strategies for implementing the principles in ways that 
fit with local situation and capacity. One can also investigate the necessity and sufficiency 
conditions of these RE principles. For example, are all of these principles necessary to build 
general resilience? Or are some RE principles particularly more relevant for building 
resilience for certain types of infrastructure-dependent systems? Empirical studies on how 
the specifics of a RE principle influence the interplay of design and self-organization is 
another important area of research. For example, a recent study used a controlled 
behavioral experiment with human participants to develop insights into what type of learning 
works and under what conditions for fostering resilience in an infrastructure-dependent 
system (Yu, Shin, et al., 2016). In addition, quantification of general resilience in 
infrastructure-dependent systems is a much needed research area that could benefit from a 
more comprehensive set of RE principles. For example, the general resilience of an urban 
water system can be quantified using a set of capital portfolios (e.g., physical capital, social 
capital, governance capital, etc.) in ways that reflect some of the RE principles discussed 
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Another important consideration for future research is that achieving general 
resilience to a broad range of disturbances is likely to be too costly or even infeasible 
compared achieving specified resilience to a well-defined set of disturbances. Limited 
budgets often force decision makers to navigate difficult tradeoffs regarding how much 
resilience is needed in what dimensions and to what disturbances. Thus, a more realistic 
option could be a complementary use of both risk analysis and resilience approach 
(Anderies, Folke, Walker, & Ostrom, 2013; Aven, 2019; Yu, Rao, et al., 2016). For example, 
in a foreseeable time period, decision makers can achieve robustness or specified resilience 
(if the system has multi-stability behavior) by carefully considering disturbances that are 
known. A probabilistic risk assessment as part of risk analysis is and will continue to be 
important for informing this process. However, decision makers in resilient systems would 
not remain idle or satisfied with just achieving short-term robustness. In parallel, they would 
engage in a cycle of continuous risk analyses with resilience principles to dynamically 
update system robustness to deal with emerging risks. In the process, they would actively 
communicate and engage with other stakeholders to co-implement anticipatory or recovery 
measures. This continual updating of short-term robustness (or specified resilience) to 
changing conditions can approximate general resilience in the long-run. Future studies 
should look into how risk analysis and resilience strategies can be applied in tandem to 
operationalize general resilience and how RE principles can be put into practice to facilitate 
this complementary use.  
 
One aspect that has been little discussed in this study is how RE principles might 
influence the transformability of an infrastructure-dependent system, the ―capacity to create 
a fundamentally new system when ecological, economic, or social structures make the 
existing system untenable‖ (Brian Walker et al., 2004). Transformability is part of the three 
core dimensions of resilience that are widely recognized in the field of social-ecological 
system resilience (persistence, adaptability, and transformability) (Folke, 2016). Is 
transformability also relevant to RE? It is important to realize that, just like social-ecological 
systems, infrastructure-dependent systems can undergo transformations to have new 
identity and function. For example, a former railway overpass in New York and a former 
highway overpass in Seoul, South Korea have been transformed into elevated linear parks 
and greenways to serve a new purpose (provision of an environmental amenity) because 
their former function (provision of a transportation space) became obsolete or untenable 
(Millington, 2015; Shafray, 2018). Infrastructure-dependent systems can also undergo 
transformations for a limited time period, e.g., temporary conversions of large public facilities 
such as community centers into shelters for housing evacuees in times of disasters (Arlikatti, 
Andrew, Kendra, & Prater, 2015). Because built components cannot transform themselves to 
have new identity and function, social systems‘ ability to initiate and implement such a 
transformative change becomes extremely important when situations call for drastic 
changes.  
 
Future research, therefore, should focus on uncovering empirical cases of 
transformations in infrastructure-dependent systems in diverse contexts and potential effects 
that RE principles may have had on the transformability of these systems. We conjecture 
that the same RE principles for adaptability are also applicable to transformability (e.g., 
functional diversity, openness in social connectivity, etc.). This is because whether a system 
change is perceived as a transformation or adaptation depends on how the focal system 
boundary is defined (Johnson et al., 2018). For example, in the case of the conversion of a 
highway overpass in Seoul, it can be viewed as a transformation if the system boundary for 
analysis is narrowly defined to focus on the highway overpass and communities immediately 
surrounding the structure. However, the same change can be also viewed as an adaptation 
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identity and function of the city remain qualitatively the same. As such, there is only a fine 
line between what constitutes transformability and adaptability.  
 
Finally, we hope that we have clearly communicated that building general resilience 
has no magic formula or blueprint panacea. Rather, we have identified principles for building 
resilience in the design, management and governance of a system. Implementation is not 
simple, nor is success ensured, however, reaching goals benefits from a clear map. Our 
intent has been to provide one. 
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